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Monday, 23 March 2015

Oligarch infighting: Kolomoisky given 24 hours to disarm his private army after storming gas giant's HQ

kolomoisky

The Ukrainian government has given the private army of billionaire Dnepropetrovsk governor Igor Kolomoysky a day to lay down their weapons, after they occupied and erected a fence around the headquarters of the national oil company.

"We won't have armed personal security forces of businessmen and politicians on the streets of our cities. This applies to every single one of them," Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said on his Facebook page.

"All security forces have 24 hours to comply with the letter of the law."


President Petro Poroshenko has also dispatched two battalions of the elite National Guard to Dnepropetrovsk, to diffuse "rising tension in the region."




"There will be no more pocket armies for each governor. Any regional armed forces must fall in with the national military hierarchy," the president warned.

Arriving in unmarked armored trucks, dozens of camouflaged men barricaded themselves in the head office of majority state-owned oil producer Ukrnafta in central Kiev on Sunday afternoon. Kolomoysky, whose net worth is estimated at $1.3 billion by Forbes but may be much greater, according to local sources, was inside, issuing orders to build an impromptu barrier around the office. The government says no permit has been issued to allow this.

Kolomoysky's companies own about 43 percent of Ukrnafta, and the government controls just over half the shares. According to previous legislation, the state needed 60 percent ownership to exercise active control over a part-private company, which meant that Kolomoysky could treat Ukrnafta as his own property, including withholding dividends from the state, and sabotaging quorums at board meetings. The conflict erupted after the Rada passed a law on Thursday, stipulating that the state could manage any company in which it had a majority share.


Kolomoysky has taken the news badly. After the government fired his protégé from Ukrtransnafta - another energy company in which he has a stake, but a transporter, not a producer - Kolomoysky also occupied its office on Friday. Accusing the government of being "Russian saboteurs" and "corporate raiders" in an expletive-filled rant to the media, he reportedly threatened to "bring 2,000 volunteer fighters to Kiev," before being persuaded to stand down.




He also allegedly temporarily froze bank accounts owned by companies affiliated with Petro Poroshenko, himself an oligarch.

From key ally to potential suspect


Until the recent fallout, the oligarch, who additionally holds Israeli and Cypriot citizenships, was considered one of Kiev's most effective allies. As well as espousing strongly nationalist rhetoric, Kolomoysky has funded several large units fighting against the rebel forces in the east of the country.


But taking on the entire state apparatus may cost the oligarch more than just financial influence.


On Monday, Valentin Nalivaichenko, the head of Ukraine's security service, the SBU, directly accused the Dnepropetrovsk authorities of "financing criminal gangs."


These have been operating near the eastern conflict zones.




"A single criminal gang has been carrying out kidnappings, murders and violence against officials in Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk. That gang has been in contact, and even received financing from Dnepropetrovsk officials," he said during a press conference in Kiev.

"Those officials are now intimidating our investigators by threatening to use illegal armed units against them in the region," said Nalivaichenko, specifically naming the threat posed by 'Sich', the very same "security firm" that has occupied the Ukrnafta head office in Kiev.


Four of Kolomoysky's allies in the Rada said on Monday that they were quitting Poroshenko's bloc, and called for a demonstration in Dnepropetrovsk, to demonstrate support for the embattled oil baron.


Assault on Canadian democracy - Stephen Harper terrorizing Canada with odious Secret Police Act


The Harper government's pursuit of its odious Secret Police Act (C51) is just another chapter in the most through-going, and massive social engineering project in the history of the country. Social engineering used to be one of the favourite phrases of the right in its attack on social programs - accusing both liberal-minded politicians and meddling bureaucrats with manufacturing the welfare state. They conveniently ignored the fact that there was huge popular demand and support for activist government.

That was the so-called golden age of capitalism and it wasn't just because of expanding government services. It was so-called because of a much broader and well-informed citizen engagement - both through social movements and as individual citizens. The level of trust in government was much higher than it is today. And absent from the picture were the factors that today dominate the political conversation: fear and economic insecurity.


Exactly how historians will describe this period in Canadian history is anyone's guess but one approach could be to look upon the Harper era as an experiment in revealing how vulnerable democracies are to political sociopaths bold enough and ruthless enough to bend or break every rule and tradition on which democracy's foundation rests.


It's not just the institutions that are vulnerable though they certainly are. It's a familiar list including Harper's bullying of Governor General Michaelle Jean to force the proroguing of the House, his guide book on how to make parliamentary committees ineffective, the use of robo-calls and other election dirty tricks, his attempt to break the rules in appointing a Supreme Court Judge and his neutering the House of Commons question period through a deliberate strategy of refusing to answer questions - a practice that institutionalizes a contempt for Parliament that spreads outward to the general public. At a certain point it doesn't matter who is responsible - the institution itself becomes risible and irrelevant to ordinary citizens. Which is, of course, exactly what Harper intends.


And that brings us to the other element of democratic politics - the actual citizens who are supposed to be the raw material of democracy. The whole institutional edifice theoretically rests on the foundation of the voting public. The extent to which the institutions of democracy can be assaulted and eroded with impunity is directly proportional to the level of civic literacy. The lower it is, the easier it is for malevolent autocrats like Harper to abuse his power.


In terms of civic literacy we are somewhere between Europe where it is relatively high and the US where it is frighteningly low. While the question is obviously more complicated than this, it's not far-fetched to suggest that there is a continuum - with consumerism at one end and highly engaged citizenship at the other. We live in a hyper-consumer society - not a citizen-society characterized by the oft-repeated disclaimer "I'm not interested in politics." The growing basis for our culture is not community or cooperation but conspicuous consumption and possessive individualism.


So long as the political elite accepted the basic premises of modern democracy and activist government, so long as the institutions they controlled functioned more or less within their defined mandates (that is, they were only occasionally abused) society could function with a minimal level of civic literacy. We could all go shopping more or less assured that the stuff of government (in substance and process) would continue undisturbed. If all political parties accepted the precepts of civil liberties, for example, it didn't matter that much if there was a low degree of public awareness of the importance of civil liberties to our daily lives.


But when a politician suddenly appears on the scene willing to systematically violate democratic principles as if they simply don't apply to him, then the demand for increased civic literacy is just as suddenly urgent and critical. Yet it is not something can be accomplished easily or quickly. Three sources come to mind: schools, the media and civil society organizations and activity.


Despite the best efforts of teachers and their unions over the decades civic literacy is extremely low on the curriculum totem pole in Canadian schools. Provincial governments have resisted such pressures which should hardly come as a surprise. There is a built in bias in a hierarchical, capitalist society against critical thinking - precisely because in liberal democracies the over-arching role of government is to manage capitalism with a view to maintaining it along with all its inherent inequalities. Too many critical thinkers is not helpful.


The media, of course, are largely responsible for helping put Stephen Harper in power. Ever since the Machiavellian Conrad Black bought up most of Canada's dailies they have been used (by him and his successors) as an explicit propaganda tool for the dismantling of the post-war democratic consensus. While there are some tentative signs that they now recognize they've created a monster (Globe editorials criticizing the PM on a number of issues like C51) it's a little late. Twenty-five years of telling people there is no alternative to unfettered capitalism has had a pernicious effect on both democracy and civic literacy.


That leaves voluntary (for the most part) civil society organizations. Yet, despite their objective of informing people about the myriad issues we face, here, too, the model falls short of significantly expanding the base of engaged, informed citizens. Ironically, much of the defensive politics of the left are the mirror image of Harper's reliance on fear (of Muslims, criminals, niqabs, terrorists, environmentalists, unions, the CBC) to energize his base. We peddle more mundane but substantive fears - of losing Medicare, of climate change, of higher tuition fees, of unprotected rivers and streams and dirty oil.


If Canadians are scared silly, it's no wonder given the mode of politics directed at them.


Regrettably there is no model from Canadian history that points us in the direction of serious commitment to civic literacy. We have to look to the Scandinavian countries. According to Canadian author Henry Milner ,"Swedish prime minister Olof Palme once said that he preferred to think of Sweden not as a social democracy but as a 'study-circle democracy.' The idea ...is associated most of all with the efforts of the ABF (the Workers' Educational Association). ...The ABF offers courses in organizing groups and co-operatives, understanding media, and a broad range of contemporary issues, as well as languages, computers, art, music, and nature appreciation." There were ten other groups doing study circles - many of them subsidized by the government. Half of all Swedish adults were involved in them


Even in Sweden the model is no longer as robust as it was when Milner wrote this assessment (2002). But even after the defeat of Social Democratic governments, no party has dared undermine Swedish social programs or run roughshod over its democracy. That's because informed citizens are not easily manipulated by fear and their level of trust in government remains high.


Given our shamefully biased media Canadians still manage to resist Harper's continued assault on our political sensibility. The first polls on the Secret Police Act (don't call it by any other name) were alarming with upwards of 80% agreeing with the need for tougher anti-terror laws. But things are changing very quickly as the result of a determined fight-back by civil society groups, a phalanx of heavy-hitting experts and the NDP. A Forum Research poll this week showed support for the Act was down to 38% with those disapproving at 51% - an amazing turn around. The highest levels of disapproval were amongst "...the youngest (64%), New Democrats (77%), the best educated (65%) and the non-religious (70%)."


Yet the Forum results are decidedly mixed and demonstrate how much work there is yet to be done to neutralize the fear campaign. When respondents were presented with specific parts of the bill the percentage disapproving actually decreased and supporters increased.


The polling will no doubt continue to demonstrate confusion, a desire to deal with the real problem of terrorism and condemnation of the attempt to at the idea of labelling environmentalists and First Nations as terror suspects.


Yet a huge effort will be needed to completely immunize Canadians against the next wave of Harper fear-mongering. Imagine if all these efforts and similar warning campaigns had instead been put into creating something similar to the Swedish "study circle democracy." That's the only lasting solution to voter manipulation and a healthy democracy. Until we realize that, progressive politics will remain crisis management and we will continue to pin our desperate hopes on coalitions and proportional representation. But without a high degree of civic literacy these institutional fixes will be ultimately dissatisfying.


Kiev threatens to cut off Russian gas imports starting April 1

gas

© Reuters / Laszlo Balogh



Kiev said it will stop importing Russian gas from next Wednesday if Gazprom doesn't offer it a better price, according to the country's Energy Minister Vladimir Demchishin. Halting supplies through Ukraine could put Europe's energy security in limbo.

"It is necessary to buy Russian gas at the moment, but buying at a higher price than we can buy from Europe makes no sense," Demchishin said Monday, as quoted by TASS.


Similar claims have been made by Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk.


Last week, Ukraine Finance Minister Natalia Yaresko said gas imports from the EU would be $50 cheaper per 1,000 cubic meters.


Russian Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak said the price Ukraine would pay for gas starting April 1 could be $348, according to preliminary calculations. Under the current 'winter plan' Russia sells gas to Ukraine at $378 per 1,000 cubic meters, but it only after receiving prepayment from Kiev.


Moscow and Kiev are expected to strike a new gas deal this week, since the 'winter plan' expires at the end of March. Ukraine expects to sign a new deal with Russian on April 13-14, according to Demchishin. At a previous meeting, Ukraine agreed to continue buying Russian gas to keeps its underground storage full in order to ensure supplies to Europe.


As of Sunday, Ukraine's gas reserves stood at 7.741 billion cubic meters, 5 percent less than on the first of the month, according to data from Gas Storage Europe (GSE). Since the beginning of the year, Ukraine's gas reserves have shrunk by 3.627 billion cubic meters, TASS reports.


Deliveries of Russian gas to Ukraine in 2014 were suspended for almost six months. On June 16 Gazprom switched to a prepayment system for Naftogaz because of a $4.5 billion debt, and only resumed deliveries on December 9.


How the touch of others makes us who we are

group hug

© colormetwentysomthing



Not only does touch seem to signal trust and cooperation, it creates them. Our sense of touch does much more than help us navigate the world at our fingertips. It is becoming clear that touching each other plays a fundamental role in our lives. It isn't just a sentimental human indulgence, says Francis McGlone at Liverpool John Moores University, UK. "It is a biological necessity."

Touching gives the world an emotional context. It builds trust and promotes teamwork, wins friends and influences people. But that's not all. Beginning in the womb, it may guide the development of regions in our brain that govern social behaviour. It could even give us our sense of self. The touch of others makes us who we are.


Compared to the other senses, however, touch often gets a raw deal. It receives less attention than sight or hearing, say. And yet the skin -- our touch detector -- is our biggest organ. An average-sized man has some 5 or 6 kilograms of it -- roughly the weight of a bowling ball. As well as regulating our temperature and shielding us from infection and injury, our skin is a communication interface with the outside world. And just as we can lose our sight or hearing, we can go touch-blind.


The Touch Research Institute at the University of Miami School of Medicine says it has carried out more than 100 studies into touch and found evidence of significant effects, including faster growth in premature babies, reduced pain, decreased autoimmune disease symptoms, lowered glucose levels in children with diabetes, and improved immune systems in people with cancer.


The nerves that carry signals from the surface of our skin to the brain run at different speeds. In the fast lane, we have A fibres, heavy duty cables that carry breaking news to the brain in an instant -- detailed information that helps us safely navigate our environment. In the slow lane, however, we have C fibres, thinner wires that deliver messages at a more languid pace. Moving at a sedate 7 kilometres an hour, information carried by one of these nerves takes about a second to travel from a caressed ankle up to the brain.


Our high-speed nervous system is relatively well understood. For years, we also thought the vocabulary of our skin was limited to messages of pressure or vibration, temperature, itches and pain. The slower C fibres were just thought to convey the less immediate components of pain -- throbs and aches, rather than pricks, stings and burns. But in the late 1990s, researchers identified a type of C fibre in humans -- dubbed C-tactile fibres or CT fibres -- that seemed to be activated by soft caresses.


People can communicate several distinct emotions through touch alone, including anger, fear, disgust, love, gratitude, and sympathy. Accuracy rates ranged from 48 per cent to 83 per cent, comparable with those found in studies of emotions shown in faces and voices. "The evidence indicates that humans can communicate several distinct emotions through touch," said Dr Hertenstein. "Our study is the first to provide rigorous evidence showing that humans can reliably signal love, gratitude and sympathy with touch. These findings raise the interesting possibility that touch may convey more positive emotions than the face.''


Most touch receptors are concentrated in places like the lips and fingertips. However, CT fibres are found only on hairy skin -- almost everywhere except the lips, palms of the hands and soles of the feet -- and are concentrated on the top of the head, upper torso, arms and thighs. Like other touch highways, CT fibres are wired up to the brain region that lets us construct a model of the physical world around us -- the somatosensory cortex. But they also plug into areas like the insular cortex, which is linked to emotions.


Touch helps to build trust


"CT fibres activate this whole network of brain regions involved in thinking about other people and trying to understand what their intentions might be," says Kevin Pelphrey of Yale University. These same regions also respond to other social cues, such as facial expressions. "We think this touch system is another way to communicate social intentions," he says.


Or as David Linden -- a neuroscientist at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, and author of new book -- puts it: fast fibres are all about the facts, slow ones the emotional vibe.


What's more, they seem to be primed to the touch of others. "These nerve fibres respond optimally to low force, low velocity, stroking movements of around 3 to 5 centimetres per second," says McGlone. In other words, a gentle stroke. This kind of touch -- variously called social, emotional or affective touch -- also seems to be activated more by warm temperatures , meaning a touch from cold hands is less rewarding. "They are exquisitely tuned to exactly the type of affiliative touching that you see between parents and baby, or between two lovers," says McGlone.


But what for? It is probably to do with social bonding, if clues from our primate cousins are anything to go by. Robin Dunbar of the University of Oxford and his colleagues at Aalto University in Helsinki, Finland, have preliminary results suggesting that gentle stroking activates similar brain pathways in humans to those that fire in non-human primates such as rhesus macaques during a grooming session. It also triggers the same release of endorphins. Interestingly, in humans, the density of an individual's endorphin receptors seems to correspond with the size of their social network.


Since gentle touching is rewarding, Dunbar thinks it encourages individuals to spend time together to develop relationships of trust and obligation. "We probably have as much physical contact within our core relationships as monkeys do within theirs," he says.


Touch lets us communicate a range of emotions. Gratitude, sympathy and love can all be conveyed with the briefest of touches. "I have always argued that touch is worth a thousand words in terms of understanding how somebody really sees you," says Dunbar.


Setting Boundaries


"The psychological sense of being oneself seems to be linked to being touched in this emotional way by another person," she says. "This may have a crucial role in teaching us the psychological boundaries of our own body, what is mine and what is not." Fotopoulou also has new results suggesting that people who have had a stroke can recover a lost sense of limb ownership if the arm or leg is stroked on a regular basis.


One question that fascinates many researchers is when this sense of identity develops. It might be that a parent's touch teaches infants about where they stop and others begin. "We aren't born with a fully fledged sense of body and self, and so we believe that what parents do is important for building it," says Fotopoulou.


Our sense of touch kicks in early. It is the first sense to develop, starting about eight weeks after conception, when the fetus is 1.5 centimetres long and brain activity is just beginning. "We know that babies are learning a great deal about touch in the uterus," says Tiffany Field, director of the Touch Research Institute at the University of Miami School of Medicine in Florida. "They suck on their thumbs, grab the umbilical cord and are constantly bumping against the walls of the mother's abdomen."


Emotional touch may also be at work in the womb. McGlone thinks that the swirl of amniotic fluid around the downy, lanugo hairs that cover a fetus may provide crucial stimulation to a developing brain, guiding the construction of areas such as the insular cortex. For McGlone, such caresses provide a kind of scaffold for the "social" parts of the brain, promoting the growth of synapses and connecting networks in key areas. And this building work continues after birth.


Ongoing stimulation is crucial for the development of other sensory systems, such as vision. If you deliberately block vision in one eye soon after birth, for example, the parts of the brain that process vision from that eye will never develop, even if it is unblocked later on.


"My hunch is that the natural interaction between parents and the infant -- that continuous desire to touch, cuddle and handle -- is providing the essential inputs that lay the foundations for a well-adjusted social brain," says McGlone. "It's more than just nice, it's absolutely critical."


Losing touch


We can lose our sense of touch in a number of ways. When Ian Waterman was 19, his immune system attacked his nerves and he lost his sense of proprioception -- a kind of internal touch that helps us locate our body in space. He could still feel pain and temperature, and his motor nervous system still functioned. But without knowing where his limbs were unless he looked, he couldn't move. It took years of mental retraining to learn how to will his arms and legs into action.


Other cases have been reported in which people lose the ability to feel prods and pokes, with similarly debilitating results. There is also a community of people in Norrbotten, Sweden, who have a genetic condition that makes them largely insensitive to pain.


Touch at a distance


Touch is a fundamental part of human communication, but in this era of remote digital interaction are we missing out? Some obviously think so, because there are now devices that can help us connect with colleagues or loved-ones remotely.


One gadget on the market is the Hug Shirt. By donning a sensor-laden sweater, you can record a cuddle by giving yourself a hug. This is then sent to a shirt worn by a recipient, which recreates the strength, duration and shape of your embrace. Other devices in development include objects that send strokes and squeezes over the internet by making companion devices respond with vibrations and temperature changes.


Can remote touches replace the real thing? Maybe. Michiel Spape at the Helsinki Institute for Information Technology in Finland and his colleagues recently invited volunteers to play a game of trust called Ultimatum remotely. In the game, two players must decide how to divide a sum of money. One is asked how the money should be split, the other accepts or rejects the proposal. If an agreement is reached, both players receive their share; if not, neither gets anything.


Being touched by someone often makes us feel more altruistic towards them, so Spape's team strapped a vibrating "tactor" to the players' hands to recreate the sense of being touched. This made it slightly more likely that players would agree when divvying up their spoils.


Hug actually affect the entire body to such an extent that many scientists claim it is equivalent to the effect of many different drugs operating on the body simultaneously. Even seemingly trivial instances of interpersonal touch can help people deal with their emotions with clarity and more effectively.


How hugs can heal


* Hugging your partner could lower his or her blood pressure.


* Researchers have found that in younger women, the more hugs they get, the lower their blood pressure.


* Researchers at the University of North Carolina who investigated 69 pre-menopausal women showed that those who had the most hugs had a reduced heart rate.


* Exactly what could be responsible is not clear, but the psychiatrists who carried out the work also found that blood levels of the hormone oxytocin were much higher in the women who were hugged the most.


* Other research finds that oxytocin is released during social contact and that it is associated with social bonding, while a study at Ohio State University shows that when it is put into wounds in animals, the injuries heal much more quickly.


* Work at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences suggests that oxytocin can induce anti-stress-like effects, including reduction in blood pressure and levels of the stress hormone cortisol: "It increases pain thresholds and stimulates various types of positive social interaction, and it promotes growth and healing. Oxytocin can be released by various types of non-noxious sensory stimulation, for example by touch and warmth," they say.


Sources:

ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

huffingtonpost.com

newscientist.com

ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

dailymail.co.uk


FLASHBACK: New details on CIA role in 1953 Iran coup - Historical model of regime change?


The 1953 coup remains a topic of global interest because so much about it is still under intense debate. Even fundamental questions — who hatched the plot, who ultimately carried it out, who supported it inside Iran, and how did it succeed — are in dispute.[1]

The issue is more than academic. Political partisans on all sides, including the Iranian government, regularly invoke the coup to argue whether Iran or foreign powers are primarily responsible for the country's historical trajectory, whether the United States can be trusted to respect Iran's sovereignty, or whether Washington needs to apologize for its prior interference before better relations can occur.



© Ali Rahnem

This map shows the disposition of bands of "ruffians," paid to demonstrate by coup organizers, early on August 19, 1953. The bands gathered in the bazaar and other sections of southern Tehran, then moved north through the capital. Thug leaders' names appear at left, along with the estimated size of their groups, and their targets.



The 1953 coup remains a topic of global interest because so much about it is still under intense debate. Even fundamental questions — who hatched the plot, who ultimately carried it out, who supported it inside Iran, and how did it succeed — are in dispute.[1]

The issue is more than academic. Political partisans on all sides, including the Iranian government, regularly invoke the coup to argue whether Iran or foreign powers are primarily responsible for the country's historical trajectory, whether the United States can be trusted to respect Iran's sovereignty, or whether Washington needs to apologize for its prior interference before better relations can occur.



© Ali Rahnema

Pro-Shah police, military units and undercover agents became engaged in the coup starting mid-morning August 19





Also, the public release of these materials is noteworthy because CIA documents about 1953 are rare. First of all, agency officials have stated that most of the records on the coup were either lost or destroyed in the early 1960s, allegedly because the record-holders' "safes were too full."[2]

Regarding public access to any remaining files (reportedly about one cubic foot of material), the intelligence community's standard procedure for decades has been to assert a blanket denial. This is in spite of commitments made two decades ago by three separate CIA directors. Robert M. Gates, R. James Woolsey, and John M. Deutch each vowed to open up agency historical files on a number of Cold War-era covert operations, including Iran, as a sign of the CIA's purported new policy of openness after the collapse of the USSR in 1991.[3]



© Ali Rahnema

Tanks played a critical role on August 19, with pro-Shah forces gaining control of some 24 of them from the military during the course of the day



A clear sign that their pledge would not be honored in practice came after the National Security Archive filed a lawsuit in 1999 for a well-known internal CIA narrative about the coup. One of the operation's planners, Donald N. Wilber, prepared the account less than a year later. The CIA agreed to release just a single sentence out of the 200-page report.

Despite the appearance of countless published accounts about the operation over the years - including Kermit Roosevelt's own detailed memoir, and the subsequent leak to The New York Times of the 200-page CIA narrative history[4] — intelligence agencies typically refused to budge. They have insisted on making a distinction between publicly available information on U.S. activities from non-government sources and official acknowledgement of those activities, even several decades after the fact.



© Ali Rahnema

Anti-Mosaddeq armed forces converged on his house (left side of map) beginning around 4:00 pm, eventually forcing him to escape over a garden wall before his house was destroyed. By then, Zahedi had already addressed the nation from the Radio Transmission Station.



While the National Security Archive applauds the CIA's decision to make these materials available, today's posting shows clearly that these materials could have been safely declassified many years ago without risk of damage to the national security. (See sidebar, "Why is the Coup Still a Secret?")

Archive Deputy Director Malcolm Byrne called for the U.S. intelligence community to make fully available the remaining records on the coup period. "There is no longer good reason to keep secrets about such a critical episode in our recent past. The basic facts are widely known to every school child in Iran. Suppressing the details only distorts the history, and feeds into myth-making on all sides."


To supplement the recent CIA release, the National Security Archive is including two other, previously available internal accounts of the coup. One is the narrative referred to above: a 1954 Clandestine Services History prepared by Donald N. Wilber, one of the operation's chief architects, which The New York Times obtained by a leak and first posted on its site in April 2000.


The other item is a heavily excised 1998 piece — "Zendebad, Shah!" — by an in-house CIA historian. (The Archive has asked the CIA to re-review the document's excessive deletions for future release.)


The posting also features an earlier declassification of The Battle for Iran for purposes of comparison with the latest release. The earlier version includes portions that were withheld in the later release. As often happens, government classification officials had quite different — sometimes seemingly arbitrary — views about what could and could not be safely made public.


Read together, the three histories offer fascinating variations in perspective — from an agency operative to two in-house historians (the last being the most dispassionate). Unfortunately, they still leave wide gaps in the history, including on some fundamental questions which may never be satisfactorily answered — such as how to apportion responsibility for planning and carrying out the coup among all the Iranian and outside actors involved.


But all 21 of the CIA items posted today (in addition to 14 previously unpublished British documents — see Sidebar), reinforce the conclusion that the United States, and the CIA in particular, devoted extensive resources and high-level policy attention toward bringing about Mosaddeq's overthrow, and smoothing over the aftermath.


DOCUMENTS


CIA Records


CIA Internal Histories


Document 1 (Cover Sheet, Summary, I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, Appendix A, Appendix B, Appendix C, Appendix D, Appendix E): CIA, Clandestine Services History, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran: November 1952 - August 1953, Dr. Donald N. Wilber, March 1954


Source: The New York Times


Donald Wilber was a principal planner of the initial joint U.S.-U.K. coup attempt of August 1953. This 200-page account is one of the most valuable remaining records describing the event because Wilber wrote it within months of the overthrow and provided a great deal of detail. Like any historical document, it must be read with care, taking into account the author's personal perspective, purpose in writing it, and audience. The CIA routinely prepared histories of important operations for use by future operatives. They were not intended to be made public.


Document 2: CIA, Summary, "Campaign to Install a Pro-Western Government in Iran," draft of internal history of the coup, undated


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


This heavily excised summary was almost certainly prepared in connection with Donald Wilber's Clandestine Services History (Document 1). By all indications written not long after the coup (1953-54), it includes several of the phrases Wilber used — "quasi-legal," and "war of nerves," for example. The text clearly gives the impression that the author attributes the coup's eventual success to a combination of external and internal developments. Beginning by listing a number of specific steps taken by the U.S. under the heading "CIA ACTION," the document notes at the end (in a handwritten edit): "These actions resulted in literal revolt of the population, [1+ lines excised]. The military and security forces joined the populace, Radio Tehran was taken over, and Mossadeq was forced to flee on 17 [sic] Aug 53."


Document 3 a & b: CIA, History, The Battle for Iran, author's name excised, undated (c. mid-1970s) - (Two versions - declassified in 1981 and 2011)


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


This posting provides two separate releases of the same document, declassified 30 years apart (1981 and 2011). Each version contains portions excised in the other. Though no date is given, judging from citations in the footnotes The Battle for Iran was written in or after 1974. It is marked "Administrative - Working Paper" and contains a number of handwritten edits. The author was a member of the CIA's History Staff who acknowledges "the enthusiastic cooperation" of the agency's Directorate of Operations. The author provides confirmation that most of the relevant files were destroyed in 1962; therefore the account relies on the relatively few remaining records as well as on public sources. The vast majority of the covert action portion (Section III) remains classified, although the most recent declassification of the document leaves in some brief, but important, passages. An unexpected feature of the document (Appendix C) is the inclusion of a series of lengthy excerpts of published accounts of the overthrow designed, apparently, to underscore how poorly the public understood the episode at the time.


Document 4: CIA, History, "Zendebad, Shah!": The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953, Scott A. Koch, June 1998


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


The most recent known internal history of the coup, "Zendebad, Shah!" was written by an in-house agency historian in 1998. It is heavily excised (but currently undergoing re-review by the CIA), with virtually all paragraphs marked Confidential or higher omitted from the public version. Still, it is a useful account written by someone without a stake in the events and drawing on an array of U.S. government and published sources not available to the earlier CIA authors.


CIA Records Immediately Before and After the Coup


Document 5: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 14, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


Kermit Roosevelt conveys information about rapidly unfolding events in Tehran, including Mosaddeq's idea for a referendum on his remaining in office, the prospect of his closing the Majles, and most importantly the impact President Eisenhower's recent letter has had in turning society against the prime minister. The U.S. government publicized Eisenhower's undiplomatic letter turning down Mosaddeq's request for financial aid. The move was one of the ways Washington hoped to weaken his political standing.


Document 6: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 15, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


Responding to the resignation of Mosaddeq supporters from the Majles, Kermit Roosevelt fires off a plan to ensure that other Majles members keep the parliament functioning, the eventual goal being to engineer a no-confidence in Mosaddeq. The memo provides an interesting clue on the subject of whether CIA operatives ever bought votes in the Majles, about which other CIA sources are vague. Roosevelt urges that as many deputies as possible be "persuaded" to take bast in the parliament. "Recognize will be necessary expend money this purpose and determine precisely who does what." At the conclusion of the document he appears to tie this scheme into the previously elaborated — but clearly evolving — coup plan.


Document 7: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 16, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


Roosevelt reports on developing plans involving Fazlollah Zahedi, the man who has been chosen to replace Mosaddeq. CIA sources, including the Wilber history, indicate that the military aspects of the plan were to be largely Zahedi's responsibility. This memo supports that (even though many details are excised), but also provides some insight into the differences in expectations between the Americans and Zahedi. With some skepticism ("Zahedi claims ..."), Roosevelt spells out a series of events Zahedi envisions that presumably would bring him to the premiership, albeit in a very round-about way. His thinking is clearly prompted by his declared unwillingness to commit "'political suicide' by extra-legal move."


Document 8: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 17, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


The CIA's Tehran station reports on the recent resignations of independent and opposition Majles members. The idea, an opposition deputy tells the station, was to avert Mosaddeq's planned public referendum. The memo gives a bit of insight into the fluidity and uncertainty of developments with each faction undoubtedly elaborating their own strategies and tactics to a certain degree.


Document 9: CIA, note to Mr. [John] Waller, July 22, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


This brief note conveys much about both U.S. planning and hopes for Mosaddeq's overthrow. It is a request from Kermit Roosevelt to John Waller and Donald Wilber to make sure that a formal U.S. statement is ready in advance of "a 'successful' coup." (See Document 10)


Document 10: CIA, note forwarding proposed text of State Department release for after the coup, August 5, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


This draft text from the State Department appears to be a result of Roosevelt's request (Document 9) to have an official statement available for use after completion of the operation. The draft predates Mosaddeq's ouster by two weeks, but its language — crediting "the Iranian people, under the leadership of their Shah," for the coup — tracks precisely with the neutral wording used by both the State Department and Foreign Office in their official paperwork after the fact.


Document 11: CIA, Memo, "Proposed Commendation for Communications Personnel who have serviced the TPAJAX Operation," Frank G. Wisner to The Acting Director of Central Intelligence, August 20, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


Wisner recommends a special commendation for the work performed by the communications specialists who kept CIA headquarters in contact with operatives in Iran throughout the coup period. "I am sure that you are aware of the exceptionally heavy volume of traffic which this operation has necessitated," Wisner writes — an unintentionally poignant remark given how little of that documentation has survived.


Document 12: CIA, Memo, "Commendation," Frank G. Wisner to CNEA Division, August 26, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


Wisner also requests a commendation for John Waller, the coup overseer at CIA headquarters, "for his work in TPAJAX." Waller's conduct "in no small measure, contributed to the successful result."


Document 13: CIA, "Letter of Commendation [Excised]," author and recipient names excised, August 26, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


Evidently after reflection, Frank Wisner concludes that there are troubling "security implications" involved in providing a letter of commendation for a covert operation.


Document 14: CIA, Memo, "Anti-Tudeh Activities of Zahedi Government," author's name excised, September 10, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


A priority of the Zahedi government after the coup was to go after the Tudeh Party, which had been a mainstay of support for Mosaddeq, even if the relationship was mostly one of mutual convenience. This is one of several memos reporting details on numbers of arrests, names of suspected Central Committee members, and planned fate of arrestees. The report claims with high specificity on Soviet assistance being provided to the Tudeh, including printing party newspapers at the embassy. Signs are reportedly mixed as to whether the party and pro-Mosaddeq elements will try to combine forces again.


Document 15: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], September 21, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


Roosevelt reports on an intense period of political maneuvering at high levels in the Zahedi government. Intrigues, patronage (including a report that the government has been giving financial support to Ayatollah Behbehani, and that the latter's son is angling for a Cabinet post), and corruption are all dealt with in this memo.


Document 16: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], September 24, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


A restless Zahedi is reported to be active on a number of fronts including trying to get a military tribunal to execute Mosaddeq and urging the Shah to fire several senior military officers including Chief of Staff Batmangelich. The Shah reportedly has not responded to Zahedi's previous five messages.


Document 17: CIA, Memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], October 2, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


According to this account, the Shah remained deeply worried about Mosaddeq's influence, even while incarcerated. Roosevelt reports the Shah is prepared to execute Mosaddeq (after a guilty verdict that is a foregone conclusion) if his followers and the Tudeh take any threatening action.


Document 18: CIA, Memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], October 9, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


Iranian politics did not calm down entirely after the coup, as this memo indicates, reporting on "violent disagreements" between Zahedi and his own supporter, Hoseyn Makki, whom Zahedi threatened to shoot if he accosted any senators trying to attend a Senate session. Roosevelt also notes two recent payments from Zahedi to Ayatollah Behbehani. The source for these provocative reports is unknown, but presumably is named in the excised portion at the top of the memo.


Document 19: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], October 20, 1953


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


Roosevelt notes a meeting between the new prime minister, Zahedi, and Ayatollah Kashani, a politically active cleric and once one of Mosaddeq's chief supporters. Kashani reportedly carps about some of his former National Front allies. Roosevelt concludes Zahedi wants "split" the front "by wooing Kashani away."


Document 20: CIA, Propaganda Commentary, "Our National Character," undated


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


This appears to be an example of CIA propaganda aimed at undermining Mosaddeq's public standing, presumably prepared during Summer 1953. Like other examples in this posting, the CIA provided no description when it released the document. It certainly fits the pattern of what Donald Wilber and others after him have described about the nature of the CIA's efforts to plant damaging innuendo in local Iranian media. In this case, the authors extol the virtues of the Iranian character, particularly as admired by the outside world, then decry the descent into "hateful," "rough" and "rude" behavior Iranians have begun to exhibit "ever since the alliance between the dictator Mossadeq and the Tudeh Party."


Document 21: CIA, Propaganda Commentary, "Mossadeq's Spy Service," undated


Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release


This propaganda piece accuses the prime minister of pretending to be "the savior of Iran" and alleges that he has instead built up a vast spying apparatus which he has trained on virtually every sector of society, from the army to newspapers to political and religious leaders. Stirring up images of his purported alliance with "murderous Qashqai Khans" and the Bolsheviks, the authors charge: "Is this the way you save Iran, Mossadeq? We know what you want to save. You want to save Mossadeq's dictatorship in Iran!"


British Records


Document 22 : FCO, Summary Record, "British-American Planning Talks, Washington," October 10-11, 1978


Source: The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) FCO 8/3216, File No. P 333/2, Folder, "Iran: Release of Confidential Records," 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1978 (hereafter: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216)


In October 1978, a delegation of British FCO officials traveled to Washington for two days of discussions and comparing of notes on the world situation with their State Department counterparts. The director of the Department's Policy Planning Staff, Anthony Lake (later to serve as President Bill Clinton's national security advisor), led the American side. Other participants were experts from various geographical and functional bureaus, including Henry Precht, the head of the Iran Desk.


Beginning in paragraph 22, Precht gives a dour summary of events in Iran: "the worst foreign policy disaster to hit the West for many years." In a fascinating back-and-forth about the Shah, Precht warns it is "difficult to see how the Shah could survive." The British politely disagree, voicing confidence that the monarchy will survive. Even his State Department colleagues "showed surprise at the depth of Mr. Precht's gloom."


In the course of his presentation (paragraph 23), Precht notes almost in passing that the State Department is reviewing its records from 1952-1954 for eventual release. A British representative immediately comments that "if that were the case, he hoped HMG [Her Majesty's Government] would be consulted."


Document 23: FCO, Minute, B.L. Crowe to R.S. Gorham, "Anglo-American Planning Talks: Iran," October 12, 1978


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


This memo recounts Precht's dramatic presentation on Iran two days earlier (see previous document). "His was essentially a policy of despair," the author writes. When the British follow up with the Americans about Precht's outlook of gloom, they find that State Department and National Security Council (NSC) staff were just as bewildered by his remarks. One NSC staff member calls them "bullshit." Policy Planning Director Lake laments the various "indiscreet and sensitive things" the Americans said at the meeting, and asks the British to "be very careful" how they handle them.


"On a completely different subject," the minute continues, "Precht let out ... that he was having to go through the records of the 1952/53 Mossadeq period with a view to their release under the Freedom of Information Act [sic]. He said that if released, there would be some very embarrassing things about the British in them." (Much of this passage is underlined for emphasis.) The note goes on: "I made a strong pitch that we should be consulted," but the author adds, "I imagine that it is American documents about the British rather than documents on which HMG have any lien which are involved." (This is a point that may still be at issue today since the question of discussing American documents with foreign governments is very different from negotiating over the use of foreign government records.)


Document 24: FCO, Letter, R.J. Carrick to B.L. Crowe, October 13, 1978


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


An FCO official reports that Precht recently approached another British diplomat to say that "he hoped we had not been too shocked" by his recent presentation. He says Precht acknowledged being "over-pessimistic" and that in any event he had not been offering anyone's view but his own.[5] According to the British, NSC staff members put more stock in the assessments of the U.K. ambassador to Tehran, Sir Anthony Parsons, than in Precht's. The writer adds that U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan also shares Parsons' judgment, and concludes, without indicating a source, that even "Henry Precht has now accepted Sullivan's view!"


Document 25: FCO, Letter, R.S. Gorham to Mr. Cullimore, "Iran: The Ghotbi Pamphlet and the Mussadeq Period," October 17, 1978


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


This cover note (to Document 24) refers to Precht's revelation about the impending American publication of documents on the Mosaddeq period. The author suggests giving some consideration to the implications of this for "our own record of the time."


Document 26: FCO, Letter, B.L. Crowe to Sir A. Duff, "Anglo-American Planning Talks," October 19, 1978


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


FCO official Brian Crowe summarizes the October 10-11 joint U.S.-U.K. talks. The document is included here mainly for the sake of comprehensiveness, since it is part of the FCO folder on the FRUS matter. The writer repeats the remark from State's Anthony Lake that "some of the comments" from the U.S. side on Iran (among other topics) were "highly sensitive" and should not be disclosed - even to other American officials.


Document 27: FCO, Letter, J.O. Kerr to B.L. Crowe, "Talks with the US Planners: Iran," October 24, 1978


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


This brief note shows that word is moving up the line in the FCO about the forthcoming FRUS volume on Iran. The writer conveys a request to have the U.K. embassy in Washington check the risks involved in the potential release of U.S. documents, and "when the State Department propose to raise them formally with us."


Document 28: FCO, letter, G.G.H. Walden to B.L. Crowe, "Anglo-American Planning Talks: Iran," November 10, 1978


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


Still more interest in the possible State Department release is reflected in this short note, now a month after the joint U.S.-U.K. talks. Here and elsewhere, the British notes erroneously report that the release will come under the Freedom of Information Act (or the Public Information Act, as given here); they are actually slated for inclusion in theForeign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series.


Document 29: FCO, R.S. Gorham cover note to Streams, "Iran: Release of Confidential Records," attaching draft letter to Washington, November 14, 1978


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


This note and draft are included primarily because they are part of the FCO file on this topic. However, the draft letter does contain some different wording from the final version (Document 31).


Document 30: U.S. Embassy London, Letter, Ronald I. Spiers to Sir Thomas Brimelow, March 24, 1975


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


Three years before Precht's revelation to his British counterparts, the U.K. sought general guidance from the State Department about how the U.S. would handle "classified information received from Her Majesty's Government." The month before, robust amendments to the U.S. Freedom of Information Act had gone into effect. This letter from the number two official in London at the time, Ronald Spiers, offers a detailed response. Britain's awareness of the new amendments and anxiousness about their implications (including the fairly abstruse question of how secret documents would be handled in court cases) show how sensitive an issue the British considered protection of their information to be. The U.S. Chargé is equally anxious to provide the necessary reassurances. (More than a decade later, Spiers would sharply oppose efforts by the State Department's Historical Advisory Committee to gain access to restricted documentation for the FRUS series.[6])


Document 31: FCO, Letter, R.S. Gorham to R.J.S. Muir, "Iran: Release of Confidential Records," November 16, 1978


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


The British embassy in Washington is alerted to the possibility of documents being released on the 1952-54 period. The FCO clearly expects that, as apparently has been the case in the past, "there should be no difficulty for the Americans in first removing ... copies of any telegrams etc from us and US documents which record our views, even in the case of papers which are not strictly speaking 'official information furnished by a foreign government.'" (This raises important questions about how far U.S. officials typically go to accommodate allied sensibilities, including to the point of censoring U.S. documents.) "What is not clear," the letter continues, "is whether they could withhold American documents which referred to joint Anglo/US views about, say, the removal of Musaddiq in 1953."


Document 32: British Embassy in Washington, Letter, R.J.S. Muir to R.S. Gorham, "Iran" Release of Confidential Records," December 14, 1978


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


This follow-up to Gorham's earlier request (Document 31) is another reflection of U.K. skittishness about the pending document release. The embassy officer reports that he has spoken to Henry Precht "several times" about it, and that the British Desk at the State Department is also looking into the matter on London's behalf. The objective is to persuade the Department to agree to withhold not only British documents but American ones, too.


Document 33: British Embassy in Washington, Letter, R.J.S. Muir to R.S. Gorham, "Iran: Release of Confidential Records," December 22, 1978


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


The embassy updates the FCO on the status of the Iran records. Precht informs the embassy that he is prepared to "sit on the papers" to help postpone their publication. Precht's priority is the potential impact on current U.S. and U.K. policy toward Iran. Conversely, a historian at the State Department makes it clear that his office feels no obligation even to consult with the British about any non-U.K. documents being considered. The historian goes on to say "that he had in the past resisted requests from other governments for joint consultation and would resist very strongly any such request from us." But the same historian admits that the embassy might "be successful" if it approached the policy side of the Department directly.


The embassy letter ends with a "footnote" noting that State Department historians "have read the 1952-54 papers and find them a 'marvelous compilation.'"


Interestingly, a handwritten comment on the letter from another FCO official gives a different view about the likely consequences of the upcoming document publication: "As the revolution [in Iran] is upon us, the problem is no longer Anglo-American: the first revelations will be from the Iranian side." In other words, the revolution will bring its own damaging results, and the revolutionaries will not need any further ammunition from the West.


Document 34: FCO, Cover Note, Cohen (?) to Lucas, circa December 22, 1978


Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216


In a handwritten remark at the bottom of this cover note, an unidentified FCO official voices much less anxiety than some of his colleagues about the possible repercussions of the disclosure of documents on Iran. Referring to a passage in paragraph 3 of the attached letter (see previous document), the writer asks: "why should we be concerned about 'any other documents'?" The writer agrees with the cover note author's suggestion to "let this matter rest for a while," then continues: "I think we ought positively to seek the agreement of others interested to Y." ("Y" identifies the relevant passage on the cover note.)


Document 35: FCO, Meeting Record, "Iran: Policy Review," December 20, 1978


Source : British National Archives, FCO 8/3351, File No. NB P 011/1 (Part A), Title "Internal Political Situation in Iran"


British Foreign Secretary David Owen chairs this FCO meeting on the unfolding crisis in Iran. It offers a window into London's assessment of the revolution and British concerns for the future (including giving "highest priority to getting paid for our major outstanding debts"). The document also shows that not everyone at the FCO believed significant harm would necessarily come to British interests from the FRUS revelations. Although he is speaking about events in 1978, I.T.M. Lucas' comment could apply just as forcefully to the impact of disclosing London's actions in 1953: "[I]t was commonly known in [the Iranian] Government who the British were talking to, and there was nothing we could do to disabuse public opinion of its notions about the British role in Iran." (p. 2)


NOTES


[1] Just in the last several years, books in English, French and Farsi by Ervand Abrahamian, Gholam-Reza Afkhami, Mohammad Amini, Christopher de Bellaigue, Darioush Bayandor, Mark Gasiorowski (and this author), Stephen Kinzer, Abbas Milani, Ali Rahnema, and others have focused on, or at least dealt in depth with, Mosaddeq and the coup. They contain sometimes wide differences of view about who was behind planning for the overthrow and how it finally played out. More accounts are on the way (including an important English-language volume on Iranian domestic politics by Ali Rahnema of the American University of Paris).


[2] Tim Weiner, "C.I.A. Destroyed Files on 1953 Iran Coup," The New York Times, May 29, 1997.


[3] Tim Weiner, "C.I.A.'s Openness Derided as a 'Snow Job'," The New York Times, May 20, 1997; Tim Weiner, op. cit., May 29, 1997. (See also the link to the Archive's lawsuit, above.)


[4] Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1979); The New York Times, April 16, 2000.


[5] Precht recalls that he was originally not slated to be at the meetings, which usually deputy assistant secretaries and above attended. But the Near East division representative for State was unavailable. "I was drafted," Precht said. Being forced to "sit through interminable and pointless talk" about extraneous topics "when my plate was already overflowing" on Iran contributed to a "sour mood," he remembered. (Henry Precht e-mail to author, June 2, 2011.)


[6] Joshua Botts, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "'A Burden for the Department'?: To The 1991 FRUS Statute," February 6, 2012, http://1.usa.gov/1FvNsqM.


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Crimea one year later - The difference between NATO invasions and Russian interventions


NATO calls Crimea "invaded" and "occupied." NATO has taught the world well what invasion and occupation really looks like, and Crimea isn't it. In 2001, NATO invaded and began the occupation of the South-Central Asian country of Afghanistan. The invasion and occupation has left tens of thousands dead, many more displaced, and has resulted in continued chaos and violence up until and including present day. Throughout the conflict, revelations of abuses, mass murder, and other atrocities including systematic torture have been exposed, perpetrated by invading NATO forces and their Afghan collaborators.

The war has also resulted in the use of armed drone aircraft which regularly kill men, women, and children indiscriminately along the Afghan-Pakistani border - a campaign of mass murder ongoing for nearly as long as the conflict has raged.


In 2003, NATO-members joined the United States in the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. An estimated 1 million people would lose their lives, including thousands of Western troops. For nearly a decade the United State occupied Iraq, and during its attempts to prop up a suitable client regime, laid waste to the nation. American forces in their bid to exercise control over the Iraqi population would conduct sweeping assaults on entire cities. The city of Fallujah would be leveled nearly to the ground, twice.


The US also maintained prison camps across the entire nation. Some vast and spanning, others dark and secret, including the infamous Abu Ghraib prison and the atrocities carried out there. In addition to Western armed forces, a significant number of paid mercenaries participated in both the occupation and the atrocities carried out during it, including the mass killing of civilians resulting in criminal cases still reverberating through Western legal systems and undermining Western credibility worldwide.


[embedded content]




This is what real invasions and occupations look like. The armed entrance into a nation, the absolute subjugation of all its people through maximum force - or as the US calls it "shock and awe" - and an occupation by gunpoint with tanks and troops in the streets of a people who do not want them there, and who are willing to fight and die to drive them out.

So when in March of 2014, Crimea was returned to Russia and NATO called the move an "invasion" and "occupation," the world was reasonably concerned. Some were concerned because they equated the words "invasion" and "occupation" with the levels of mass murder and decimation associated with NATO's decades of foreign interventions - believing that such violence was now unfolding in Crimea, this time at the hands of the Russians. Others were concerned because of the obvious falsehood within which NATO was framing events in Crimea.


The Difference Between NATO and Russian Interventions



NATO's intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan ran into heavy resistance while Russia's intervention in Crimea did not, because of several crucial differences. First, NATO was invading nations literally oceans away. The targets of their military aggression shared no common history with the West, no cultural, religious, or linguistic similarities, and surely no mutual contemporary shared interests. No significant party within either Iraq or Afghanistan asked the West to intervene beyond token proxies arranged by the West itself. Crimea on the other hand, had once existed as part of Russia. Many in Crimea identify themselves either as Russians, or of Russian descent. They speak Russian and observe Russian customs. Many in Crimea recognize that the soil beneath their feet has been soaked in Russian blood to defend it from aggression throughout history, including against the Nazis in World War 2.

When the government of Ukraine was violently overthrown by an overtly US-backed coup in Kiev, and many of the familiar symbols and movements that had in the past taken power with the help of Adolf Hitler in the 1940's began stirring in western Ukraine again, turning to Russia for protection was only natural. Not only did the people of Crimea ask Russia to intervene, a referendum was held that overwhelmingly quantified their request.


Aside from storming several military bases and some tense moments in stand-off's with Ukrainian troops, there was no violence when Russian forces began moving into Crimea.


A Year On, All is Well...


Life in Russian Crimea today is exceedingly normal. While a war rages on next door in Ukraine, the people of Crimea enjoy peace, stability, and a sense of unity and hope for the future. Even with economic setbacks delivered by NATO's attempts to take the horrors they've created within Ukraine, and recreate them on the other side of the border in Russia, people are still able to conduct business more or less as they did before the conflict began. Some say the economy has actually improved despite the sanctions.


Of course, the transition, with an armed conflict unfolding just across the border, is not seamless. Euronews would report mixed feelings in Crimea, stating in its article, "Crimea economy one year on after Russian annexation," that:



Most supplies come from Russia by ferry but bad weather can delay shipments for days. Many products are just not available. Regional government data showed inflation jumped 38 percent and the cost of food increased by almost a half from March through to December. Not a single Russian supermarket chain has opened in Crimea.




But a poll at the end of January by a Ukraine market research agency recorded that more than half of the 800 people questioned believe they are better off financially since joining Russia.



Despite this, after only a year, and considering the circumstances, Crimea is faring well, especially compared to neighboring Ukraine. Logistical networks will surely be restructured and markets will surely adjust. With the West desperately seeking to portray Crimea's state one year after returning to Russia as dire as possible, that the best they can do is cite the disappearance of "McDonald's" and "Apple" stores as "proof" that Crimea is "suffering," bodes well for the Crimean people.

While NATO calls this an "invasion" and "occupation," it is ironically NATO itself that has taught the world so well what a real invasion and occupation looks like, making their recent claims against Russia in Crimea ring particularly hollow. Also ironic is the fact that the NATO-backed regime in Kiev, Ukraine, is imposing upon its own people the conditions and horrors generally associated with a real invasion and occupation. That some call the conflict in Ukraine one of several "proxy wars" NATO is waging around the world, this should come as no surprise.



Small newspaper reports about vaccine-damaged children receiving financial compensation from the federal vaccine court


The corporate media won't report such cases because their bottom line is more important than being honest with their readers, but vaccine damages do occur, even if the big newspapers don't want to risk their pharmaceutical industry ad purchases to tell you about them.

But not all media is corrupted in that manner, so our hats go off to the small-time , of Charlotte, North Carolina, which had the courage to tell the story of a local resident whose child has no future, thanks to vaccines.


As the paper reported in its February 28 edition online:


As they started their family, Mooresville residents Theresa and Lucas Black dutifully got their children immunized, never doubting their doctor's word that vaccines are safe and necessary.


But their faith in those promises was shaken in 2001, when their 3-month-old daughter, Angelica, developed life-threatening seizures and brain damage just three days after getting several vaccinations.


A neurologist in Charlotte diagnosed Angelica with vaccine-related encephalopathy - a brain injury. And in 2006, she was awarded $2 million plus $250,000 from a little known federal judiciary called the "vaccine court," which was established just for this purpose: Paying out vaccine-related injury claims.


'Anti-vaxxers' derided and compared to common criminals who should be jailed


So much for vaccines never causing harm; they have done so with such frequency that there had to be a special federal court established to handle the claims.


And now, Theresa Black, Angelica's mother, is being forced to suffer again, as the recent measles outbreak in California is causing her to feel bullied. If anyone has a right to oppose mandatory vaccinations, it is certainly the parent of a child permanently and irreparably damaged by them.


Federal, state and local health officials insist without reserve that vaccines are safe - always. Many have even strongly hinted that any parent who doesn't vaccinate their children ought to be charged with child abuse and even jailed.


"Anti-vaxxers often claim the right not to put 'poison' in their children's bodies. That is ludicrous," wrote Alex Berezow, founding editor of RealClearScience.com and co-author of , in a January 28 column in .


"A mountain of data has demonstrated that vaccines are safe and effective. Insisting otherwise is akin to believing that the moon landing was faked," he continued. "It is time to end this insanity. Though jail sounds drastic, it could be the only way to send a strong message about the deadly consequences of failing to vaccinate children."


Such radicalism angers parents like Black.


"There's people out there calling for us to get jailed," Black said. "I am not a freak. I am not trying to endanger anyone's child. ... I actually think vaccinating is a good thing. My problem is I don't think they are as safe as they could be. ... There are bad things that happen."


It is good this case got some press


But, as Angelica reminds her daily, there is nothing inherently safe about vaccines. Today, at 14 years old, Angelica is severely disabled, and she always will be. She is stricken with cerebral palsy and has a seizure disorder. She cannot speak and she must be fed through a tube. She is confined to a wheelchair. And because she is a 24-hour care case, her parents had to quit work to be at home for her 'round the clock.


Renee Gentry, a Virginia lawyer who represented the Blacks before the vaccine court, added that she has also been disturbed by some of the reaction to the measles outbreak.


"People are saying there's absolutely no evidence that vaccines cause brain injury, and we're sitting here with all these cases. It's rare ... but they clearly have happened," Gentry told the .


Not that rare. In the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration established the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program . Set up within the Department of Health and Human Services, the program "was established to ensure an adequate supply of vaccines, stabilize vaccine costs, and establish and maintain an accessible and efficient forum for individuals found to be injured by certain vaccines."


You can read about Angelica's case here. Bravo to for covering the story.