Minsk 1 month later: Same old story

So, in about a month after signing the 2nd Minsk agreements, which led to already a 3rd "truce", we see the already quite familiar picture.

1. There is a partial exchange of prisoners. The junta continues to use regular civilians, who are often suspected of supporting Novorossia, among the people returned into the DPR and the LPR. POWs are often returned with the traces of beatings and torture.


2. The intensity of military action reduced significantly and currently we are seeing more of a series of local firefights and shelling instead of a burning front line. The initiative in the business of violating the cease-fire regime belongs to the junta, which regularly attempts to probe the NAF defenses at Shirokino, Peski, and Bakhmutka.


3. The pullback of heavy artillery on the NAF side is effectively in its concluding phase. On the other hand, the junta continues to cheat, engaging in redeployment of the artillery in the area of the front line instead of its withdrawal.

So, even these three points, which were noted as the most realistic back in February, are being implemented with great difficulty; similar points of the first Minsk agreements were implemented in the same fashion.

In the questions of political nature we observe the predictable dead-end.

1. The blockade of Donbass is not lifted and they are not going to lift it.


2. There's no amnesty, furthermore, it is openly stated that it won't be extended to the leadership of the DPR and the LPR.


3. The constitutional reform hasn't started.


4. The attempts to bypass the question of the border by inviting peacekeepers expectedly failed.


5. There is no clarity in the political future of Donbass, which would allow to solve a number of conflicting questions.

In essence, we are seeing a reissue of the first Minsk for almost a month now, which is accompanied by pretty much the same foreign policy background.

1. Every day Russia is threatened with new sanctions and ultimatums given on the principle "Do as we say, or else..."


2. The junta continues to prepare for war on the background of diplomatic maneuvering, both at the account of its own resources and also due to foreign aid.


3. During the "truce" we regularly see various provocations, both in the area of the front line and also in other areas (mining bridges in Crimea, a weird explosion in Kharkov).


4. The USA still try to build a wide anti-Russian coalition and make the conflict wider, which is served by diplomatic maneuvering around the weapon shipments to Ukraine.

Overall for now there are no drastic differences from the autumn situation for now. At this moment the third "truce" is playing the role of a temporary respite before a new stage of intensive military action as a part of spring-autumn campaign of 2015. So, it is not surprising that despite the pullback of artillery military buildup and replenishment of units that suffered losses in the spring campaign continues in Novorossia. Meanwhile, forced mobilization continues in the Ukraine, there is ongoing accumulation of reserves and replenishment of the battered units.

In general, as it was noted earlier, without achieving direct agreements between Russia and the USA there is no speaking of a quick resolution to this conflict.