The impending color revolution in Kyrgyzstan

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Kyrgyzstan flag

The Male Nuland And The US' Central Asian Strategy

One of the most prominent Color Revolution experts in America's coup d'état toolkit has been hurriedly recalled from retirement for immediate deployment to Kyrgyzstan. Richard Miles, the engineer of the first Color Revolution in Serbia and the Rose Revolution in Georgia, has been appointed as charge d'affaires in Kyrgyzstan until a new ambassador is confirmed by the Senate, because the former one, Pamela Spratlen, has been reassigned as the US Ambassador to Uzbekistan. While it is not known how long Miles will remain in Kyrgyzstan, which will be the Eurasian Union's weakest economy when it joins in May of this year, ordinary citizens there already suspect that foul play is being planned against their country and have protested his arrival. Given that Miles' track record of regime change makes him worthy of the 'Male Nuland' moniker, it's appropriate to investigate what tricks the US may be up to in Central Asia, and how it may be trying to force the Ukrainian scenario onto Russia's southern doorstep.

The Male Nuland

Richard Miles a.k.a father of Color Revolution

Richard Miles has kept a relatively low profile throughout the years and hasn't garnered the notoriety that his ideological protégé Nuland has, but this doesn't mean that he's any less dangerous for the countries he visits. In fact, since he's the individual who spearheaded the Color Revolution tactic in the first place, he can even be referred to as a 'proto Nuland', owing to his 'successes' in Serbia and Georgia that helped make EuroMaidan possible in the first place. While he was no longer the American Ambassador to Yugoslavia when the 2000 Bulldozer Revolution overthrow Slobodan Milosevic, he certainly paved the way for its implementation during his work over the three years prior, including overseeing the NATO War on Serbia. As regards Georgia, he served as US Ambassador from 2002-2005 and repeated the Belgrade template in Tbilisi.

Afterwards, he became the Executive Director for the Open World Leadership Center for most of 2006, during which he fostered the creation of thousands of pro-American 'leaders' in the former Soviet Union. To Center's own mission statement concisely describes the type of work that it does:

"Begun as a pilot program in 1999 and established as a permanent agency in late 2000, the Center conducts the first and only international exchange agency in the U.S. Legislative Branch and, as such, has enabled more than 17,000 current and future leaders from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan to meaningfully engage and interact with Members of Congress, Congressional staff, and thousands of other Americans, many of whom are the delegates' direct professional counterparts."

The above statement can be read as an admission that the Center's purpose is to create pro-American proxies that can seamlessly interact with and do the bidding of their Washington patrons, thereby essentially making it an NGO front for the US intelligence community's cultivation of Color Revolution assets. The organization doesn't hide the fact that its purpose is to promote American interests and profit, brazenly bragging that:

"Open World offers an extraordinary "bang for the buck" in terms of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and value. The Center boasts an overhead rate of about 7 percent, every grant contains cost-shared elements, and more than 75 percent of our appropriation is plowed back into the American economy every year. The Center might best be described as both a mini-stimulus plan as well as a true international exchange program."

Bearing in mind Miles' experience in running this Color Revolution recruitment front, as well as his contribution to managing two 'successful' regime change operations in Serbia and Georgia, he can easily be identified as one of the most dangerous people in the US deep state establishment, and the fact that he was recalled from retirement to urgently take the 'temporary' post in Kyrgyzstan during these tense geopolitical times must absolutely be seen as a warning about Washington's nefarious intentions .

Uzbekistan's Role In The US' Central Asian Strategy

While Washington is poised to destabilize Kyrgyzstan, it's showing strong signals that it's ready to do the opposite in neighboring Uzbekistan, and has been reingratiating itself with Tashkent over the past couple of years in a bid to shore up what it intends to become its Lead From Behind proxy in the region.

Safeguarding The Strategist:

Before going into the specifics and forecast for this strategic partnership, it's necessary to look at how the US' latest ambassadorial arrangement is meant to facilitate all of this. Ambassador Pamela Spratlen's reassignment from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan must be seen as something other than a simple diplomatic shuffle. Spratlen's biography shows that she's one of the US' premier strategists for Central Asia, having previously held the posts of Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Astana, Director of Central Asian Affairs, and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia, et al.Thus, given her importance in crafting the US' regional strategy for Central Asia, it's not likely that her handlers would allow such a valuable asset to sit smack dab in the middle of their next targeted state, considering that their hefty investment in her may go to waste if she's killed or kidnapped in the proceeding violence that's being planned. Such a mistake was made with Ambassador Christopher Stevens, one of the architects of the US-supported Libya-Syria terrorist nexus, and the US is keen to avoid having Spratlen meet an untimely end in such a shameful and embarrassing manner. Rather, seeing as how she's a strategic specialist and not a tactical one like Miles, it's more useful to place her in a safe location where she can supervise, assess, and direct events as they develop, hence why she's been ordered to Tashkent.

The Lead From Behind Blueprint:

Spratlen's diplomatic experience in handling Central Asian affairs makes her possibly the best candidate that the US can send to Uzbekistan to seal the deal on a strategic partnership. First things first, it's worth noting that relations between Washington and Tashkent have been on the mend since the 2005 Andijan Incident led to the practical destruction of bilateral ties. In the years since, the US lifted its military embargo on the country and even bequeathed it with 308 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and 20 additional support vehicles from Afghanistan earlier this year, with Uzbekistan only paying the cost of transporting them. On the surface this may only seem to be a symbolic gift of friendship, but in reality, there's a lot more to it. For instance, Uzbekistan will now be dependent on US-supplied parts and expertise for upkeep, thereby implicitly deepening the military-technical cooperation between the two countries. On top of that, it's been noted that the MRAPs are largely ineffective in combating drug smuggling and terrorism, but acquire their real importance in crowd control. This factor becomes exceptionally important when one recognizes how close the country stands to the precipice of chaos, but for the time being, it doesn't look like the US has the intention of stirring the bubbling pot of destabilization (which could still overflow regardless of American meddling), and instead is opting to reinforce the state for its own gain.

The US vision for Central Asia thus deserves further examination in order to figure out its true nature then, since it's known that the US could easily instigate the creation of a Black Hole of Chaos in Uzbekistan by manipulating the many levers of destabilization there at any time that it sees fit. This would certainly carry with it immense strategic value for the US in its quest to cripple Russia, but it also has one major vulnerability, and it's that Uzbekistan could receive Russian and Chinese assistance in combating the US-directed chaos and emerge from the crisis as a stronger and more closely integrated member of Eurasian integrational structures, beginning with the SCO and possibly even ending with integration into the Eurasian Union and reintegration into the CSTO. If Russia and China are successful in assisting Uzbekistan (and they've been already been expecting some vague form of regional destabilization after the 2014 NATO drawdown), then the end result would be the near-complete removal of American influence in Central Asia after the carnage has ended, meaning that non-West would be secured (despite at what may be devastating costs) in the face of the Reverse Brzezinski's ultimate failure.

Overcoming The Competition With Russia:

Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) and Uzbek President Islam Karimov attend a meeting at Kuksaroy residence in Tashkent on December 10, 2014.

Understanding that such a black hole gambit can be deployed at any time, the US seems to instead have chosen to fortify Uzbekistan as their Lead From Behind partner in the interim, with the hopes that the region's largest military and population could project increased anti-Russian influence on all four of the other former Soviet republics that it abuts. As it stands, Uzbekistan is still formally opposed to any form of Russian-led integration, as President Islam Karimov said in January that his country will never join any "alliance similar to the U.S.S.R.", and it even withdrew from the CSTO in 2012. Be that as it may, Russia has been making strong strides in renewing its formerly close relations with the country. Putin visited Karimov in December and spoke about the mutual benefits of Eurasian integration, and announced that both sides had begun consultations on a possible deal between Uzbekistan and the Eurasian Union. To top it off, the Russian President even declared that Moscow would write off $890 million of Uzbekistan's Soviet-era debt (with only $25 million of it still having to be paid), in what The Diplomat analyzed as demonstrating Russia's commitment to strengthening ties with Tashkent.

In such a situation, it's doubtful that Uzbekistan would turn against Russia on its own prerogative and agitate against Moscow's interests in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. But still, Uzbekistan knows that it's a battlefield in the 'New Cold War', and that it can play this role to its advantage to enact even greater concessions from both Washington and Moscow. One needs to keep in mind that the US wants to transform Uzbekistan into its Lead From Behind proxy for Central Asia (seeing as how it has the potential to become the regional powerhouse and counteract Russia's Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik partners), but it can't do this if Uzbekistan retains positive relations with Russia. Thus, it needs to make sure that Uzbekistan does not have a rapprochement with Russia that would endanger American interests (be it naturally occurring or as the result of Russian assistance in defending against an American-inspired chaotic subversion), hence why it aims to drive a militant wedge between Tashkent and Moscow in the same way as it has done between the latter and Kiev. This is precisely the reason why it wants to create a Black Hole of Chaos in Kyrgyzstan via yet another Color Revolution there, since the expected aftershocks (to be described in the follow-up article) run the high chance of being manipulated to the point where they can turn Uzbekistan and Russia into enemies, which would 'naturally' make Tashkent the US' Lead From Behind proxy. Should this plan fail, then the US can always follow up with 'Plan B' and unleash uncontrollable chaos inside the country (as was described earlier).

The Central Asian Front

Strategic Theory:

The US' primary goal in creating chaos in Central Asia is to split Russia's focus in dealing with the Ukrainian Crisis and create a situation where its decision makers are unable to adequately protect the country's entire periphery. This is envisioned as leading to the penetration of chaotic dynamics directly into the Russian Federation itself (be it from the west or the south), which could contribute to the realization of the 'Eurasian Balkans' end game of dividing the country into ethnic and regional fiefdoms and indefinitely prolonging the US' unipolar moment. In order to get to such a grand finale, a series of steps must be taken in the countries around Russia to provoke such a scenario.

The unravelling of the Ukrainian state represents the theory's application in Eastern Europe, the threat of a continuation war in Nagorno-Karabakh fulfills the Caucasus component of this idea, and the looming Kyrgyz catastrophe wraps up the Central Asian front for the US' pan-Eurasian campaign against Russia. Each of these simmering conflicts has the potential to (re)explode at any time, and if they occur in near-simultaneity, then Russia will be hard-pressed to deal with them all, and may predictably fumble in its approach and create even larger openings for more chaos to rip through its borders.

Even if these aforementioned conflicts don't break out concurrently, the fact that three massive vacuums of destabilization are sitting on the Russia's doorsteps means that the threat always remains that one, two, or all of them can heat up sometime in the future. This accordingly leaves Russian decision makers continually on edge and siphons off strategic resources into crafting contingency measures against these probable scenarios that could be of more productive use elsewhere, such as in preparing foreign policy initiatives that could for once place the West on the strategic defensive (for example, protecting Macedonia and promoting the 'New South Stream').

The 21^st -Century Reagan Doctrine:

All of the abovementioned strategic imperatives aren't the realm of speculation, however, since then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton firmly declared in December 2012 that it will do whatever it can to sabotage Russian-led integration processes in the former Soviet sphere. Referring to the Eurasian Union, she said:

"There is a move to re-Sovietise the region, It's not going to be called that. It's going to be called a customs union, it will be called Eurasian Union and all of that, but let's make no mistake about it. We know what the goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it."

This is none other than a 21^st-century application of the Reagan Doctrine, whereby the US will now seek to aggressively roll back Russian influence in the Near Abroad instead of Soviet influence across the world. Seen through this context, the US' integrated strategy in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia makes more sense. Ukraine would have been the second-largest economy in the Eurasian Union and could have provided a valuable contribution to its overall strength, should the EuroMaidan Color Revolution not have derailed any realistic hopes for it joining in the near future. In the Caucasus, Eurasian Union-member Armenia is geographically cut off from the rest of its partners, being separated by EU-aspiring Georgia and hostile Azerbaijan. This lays the pretext for a coming EU-Eurasian Union crisis in the Caucasus, which could massively destabilize Russia regardless if a continuation war occurs in Nagorno-Karabakh or not.

Completing the encirclement, an outbreak of violence in Kyrgyzstan as a result of yet another Color Revolution there could lead to the formation of a terrorist hotspot inside the Eurasian Union's newest member, as well as creating an almost irresistible temptation for Russia and the CSTO to fall for a disastrous Reverse Brzezinski intervention. In all three theaters, American foreign policy and regional meddling are the engines for destabilization, while Russia and the Eurasian Union are the ultimate targets, just as Hillary threatened they would be nearly three years ago. In the time since, Ukraine has fallen to Western domination and is rapidly being integrated into Shadow NATO, Nuland is conspiring to reignite the Nagorno-Karabakh war, and now the 'Male Nuland' is ready to wreak havoc in Kyrgyzstan, showing that the 21^st-century Reagan Doctrine is in full swing.

Part II

Mar 6, 2015

The Coming Color Revolution Chaos And 'Media Crimea' In Kyrgyzstan

The first part of the article discussed Richard Miles' Color Revolution credentials and why the arrival of the 'Male Nuland' in Bishkek likely portends an oncoming destabilization there. It also looked at American policy towards Uzbekistan and the importance of Ambassador Spratlen's appointment to Tashkent. An overview of the US' grand strategy against Russia, as adapted for the Central Asian vector, was also explored in that section. At this juncture, the article forecasts what the chaos that Miles is about to unleash in Kyrgyzstan will look like, including the tempting 'media Crimea' scenario that is bound to split Tashkent from Moscow and crown Uzbekistan as the US' long-term Lead From Behind proxy in Central Asia.



The Kyrgyz Game Plan:

Zeroing in on Kyrgyzstan and Richard Miles' 'temporary' appointment as the de-facto ambassador there, it's likely that the general course of Color Revolutionary chaos will take on a relatively predetermined path. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for October, and will likely serve as 'the event' needed to 'justify' a Color Revolution. This is a very opportune time for the destabilization to commence, since Kyrgyzstan would have already joined the Eurasian Union, and 'opposition' candidates and/or activists can attempt to manipulate this into a campaign issue (either within the country or in front of the foreign media). Also, October represents the tail end of fall and the beginning of winter, which in Kyrgyzstan, leads to a de-facto months-long division between the North and the South owing to the blocking of critical mountain passes connecting the two.

With the country having almost split during the last spate of externally driven instability in 2010, the prospects remain for it to do so once more if there's a repeat of similar violence. This is because the North-South Kyrgyzstan rivalry hasn't gone away in the years since, but only went underground and outside of the international public's attention. The emergence of 'South Kyrgyzstan' in fact or in form could become an epicenter of future conflicts and easily follow the Afghan model of drug trafficking and terrorism. These fears could create the conditions needed to force Russia and the CSTO into a Reverse Brzezinski intervention, made even more difficult by the mountainous terrain that favors insurgency over counter-guerrilla operations. Left to its own, 'South Kyrgyzstan's' black hole of destabilization could combine with a renewed Taliban threat in Afghanistan to existentially endanger Tajikistan, which aside from further pressuring Russia to intervene and crush the fledgling 'Central Asian Islamic State', could raise fears in China that Uighur terrorists will exploit the disorder to establish bases for carrying out attacks in Xinjiang.

The entire dynamic would be complicated by the re-eruption of ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan's portion of the Fergana Valley, where the ethnic Uzbeks' grievances and the tensions between them and ethnic Kyrgyz were simply swept under the rug for the past few years in the same way that the North-South Kyrgyzstan rivalry was. In the event that Miles succeeds in initiating any type of Color Revolution disorder in the country (which given its existing instability, isn't that difficult to do), it's expected that the 2010 ethnic chaos will return, when about 300,000 Uzbeks were displaced and 100,000 fled to Uzbekistan. This time, however, instead of Uzbekistan sitting on the sidelines and reacting to the crisis, it's forecasted that it will directly intervene in the country, which is the tripwire that will irrevocably break Uzbek-Russian bilateral relations and herald in Tashkent's role as the US' Lead From Behind partner in Central Asia.

Breaking Kyrgyzstan

If the Kyrgyz authorities and their Eurasian Union and SCO allies aren't successful in quickly containing and extinguishing Miles' planned Color Revolutionary violence, then the prospects for foreign military intervention dramatically increase, due to all actors' fears that the situation will rapidly spiral out of control if left unattended. While it's never known exactly how any campaign can play out in advance, if the oncoming crisis in Kyrgyzstan even remotely mirrors that which the country experienced in 2010 (as was forecasted above), then the following is the most likely way that events could play out:

The Kant Air Base And Northern Kyrgyzstan:

Russia retains an air base in Kant, located on the outskirts of Bishkek, and it's forecasted that this would form the nucleus of any stabilization force deployed to Kyrgyzstan. As previously mentioned, Russia will try its best not to get trapped in the Kyrgyz cauldron, meaning that it would likely limit any boots on the ground to Northern Kyrgyzstan, where they can more easily assist in restoring peace and order in cooperation with their legitimate counterparts there. This intervention only becomes possible if the Kyrgyz security forces begin to lose control of the capital and other major cities in the north straddling the Kazakh border, and specifically request external assistance in restoring governance there. Even then,the Russians could always take a 'wait-and-see' approach to avoid being drawn into a Reverse Brzezinski, but if the violence becomes uncontrollable, they'll be forced to intervene, especially if the Kant Air Base is threatened.

On the other hand, unlike in 2010 when Russia refused to conventionally intervene in support of the friendly revolutionary government, in 2015, the situation may be that the friendly legitimate authorities request Moscow's help in order to beat back violent anti-Russian mobs trying to seize control of the state a la the EuroMaidan model. In such a situation, it may be hard for Russia to say no, understanding that failure to shore up stability in Kyrgyzstan could either create the black hole of chaos that it's been dreading or lead to the establishment of a radical pro-Western government obsessed with purusing a Russophobic foreign policy. Not only that, but a serious crisis of that nature sprouting up inside the Eurasian Union could destabilize the entire organization and increase pressure on Russia and the other members (all of which are part of the CSTO) to actively respond.

In any case, it is highly unlikely that Russia and its partners will intervene in Fergana Valley, because just like in 2010, they don't want to dangerously get caught between two warring ethnicities and/or create the impression (which would be obviously manipulated by the hypocritical Western media) that they're waging a 'war on Islam' by 'occupying' conservative Muslim strongholds there. As for Southern Kyrgyzstan, it will most probably remain a 'no-go' zone for all foreign military parties due to the forthcoming winter snow (if the destabilization commences in October as predicted) that would hinder all but the most essential military operations in that mountainous and sparsely populated area.

Uzbekistan And The 'Media Crimea':

Seeing as how the Fergana Valley isn't anticipated to have any Russian or CSTO military intervention in the event of any forthcoming Kyrgyz destabilization, this leaves Uzbekistan as the only probable actor that can flex its muscles in that area. At this moment, one needs to recall the first part of this article dealing with the US' strategy towards Uzbekistan, Ambassador Pamela Spratlen, and Washington's desire to see the country become the pro-Western Lead From Behind proxy for Central Asia. It should also not be forgotten that Uzbekistan and Russia appear to be on the cusp of a minor renaissance of relations, and that the US has a vested interest in tearing Tashkent and Moscow apart just it did Kiev and Moscow after EuroMaidan. Keeping this in mind, it becomes understandable why the US would press for an Uzbek 'humanitarian intervention'/'Responsibility 2 Protect' in the Fergana Valley in the foreseeable event that ethnic clashes resume between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz there amidst a statewide meltdown. Considering that this would amount to Uzbekistan invading a CSTO-member state (Kyrgyzstan), such an action would certainly bring Uzbek-Russian relations to a crisis level, which is exactly what the US wants.

In fact, Pamela Spratlen's ultimate strategic objective is to convince Uzbekistan to perform a 'media Crimea' in the Fergana Valley in order to lay the seeds for prolonged tension between it and Russia for the years to come. By this, it is meant that Uzbekistan actually perform in the Fergana Valley what the Western media falsely stated that Russia had done in Crimea, which is a military invasion and subsequent annexation of its neighbor's territory on the grounds of protecting one's ethnic compatriots. Russia never did any of this, but it doesn't matter, since it's still guilty of these 'crimes' in the eyes of the Western media, and the international audience is now largely attuned to understanding what the fake 'Crimea precedent' means. Thus, if Uzbekistan stages a 'media Crimea' and invades and annexes Kyrgyzstan's Uzbek-populated parts in the Fergana Valley (perhaps even spreading to include all or parts of Osh and Jalal-Abad, Kyrgyzstan's most important cities in the area), then this would not come as a surprise, and ironically, would actually be cheered on by the West.

Other than precipitating a major crisis between Uzbekistan and Russia/CSTO (which would automatically make Tashkent turn to the West), it would also be a way to 'stick it to Russia' by using the fake 'Crimea precedent' as a weapon to harm its interests, which could then be touted as an informational victory in its own right (despite not having any real connection to Russia's actual actions vis-à-vis Crimea). If Uzbekistan balks at Spratlen's initial 'suggestion' of a 'media Crimea', then she could always turn up the heat by utilizing existing Color Revolution infrastructure within the country to launch a massive 'grassroots' campaign to pressure the authorities to accede to her demands. This could realistically be coupled with Western governments 'guilting' Uzbekistan for its failure to intervene next door, much as they attempted to do with Turkey over Ayn al-Arab (Kobani in Kurdish). If the Uzbek authorities continue to refuse Spratlen's 'suggestion', then the 'grassroots' movement for a 'media Crimea' in the Kyrgyz Fergana Valley can morph into an actual Color Revolution attempt against the government, which might just be the straw that breaks the state's back.

Chinese Mediation:

Throughout all of this, China's mediation role is assured due to its strategic interests in all three actors. The Russian-Chinese Strategic Partnership guarantees that Moscow and Beijing have no intention of ever butting heads over something as relatively minor to their bilateral relationship as Uzbekistan, while China's hefty energy investments and pivotal pipeline transit through Uzbekistan makes it so that Beijing will not turn a blind eye towards Tashkent's interests as well. While China may publicly chastise Uzbekistan through the SCO format for its 'media Crimea' in Fergana, it will by no means support a Russian/CSTO military counter-measure against it (which is unlikely anyhow) because it believes that such a move could further destabilize the country and endanger its pipeline security.

Russia is not expected to behave unilaterally and/or militarily respond to Uzbekistan, and in any case, it will not risk jeopardizing the Russian-Chinese Strategic Partnership after Beijing warns it not to do so.The Strategic Partnership is thus that it is fully dependent on trust between Moscow and Beijing, and that if either one violates this understanding and begins behaving in a manner that is seen as counter to the other's interests, a classic security dilemma can emerge that could speedily lead to the dismantlement of the 'gentleman's agreement' and a possible Sino-Russian split. Both sides are acutely aware of this and know that the US fantasizes about such a scenario, hence why they will not risk a falling out over something as relatively trivial to them (in the global perspective) as Uzbekistan.

Concerning Kyrgyzstan, China is currently involved in an anti-terror campaign in Xinjiang against militant Uighur separatists, and it fears that a destabilized Kyrgyzstan abutting the province could serve as a terrorist rear base. Thus, it is in Beijing's interests to see overall stability returned to Kyrgyzstan if it becomes wracked with violence after another US-directed Color Revolution, but due to its tradition of non-interference, it will stop short of committing its troops to any operation on its territory. Instead, it will likely fortify the border as much as it can and take the diplomatic lead in helping all parties in the country reach a negotiated settlement in order to restore peace as soon as possible. Once this is achieved, albeit even partially, then all the countries can begin to (jointly?) tackle the shared problem of Southern Kyrgyzstan.

The Conundrum Over Southern Kyrgyzstan:

Amidst turbulence in Northern Kyrgyzstan and possible Uzbek annexation in the Fergana Valley, Southern Kyrgyzstan will be largely forgotten until these two issues are first dealt with. As was discussed earlier, October (the time of the Parliamentary elections, the suspected Color Revolution onset event) is very close to the beginning of winter, and if the period of destabilization described above is not resolved soon enough, then the inclement weather may de-facto intervene to divide the country by cutting off the few mountain passages linking the north and south. This would have the effect of incubating Southern Kyrgyzstan's drug and terrorism threats and preventing all but the most serious and determined external interventions from eradicating them before they spread throughout the region.

Of course, the mountainous population of this portion of Kyrgyzstan (minus the Fergana Valley, of course) is very small, but still, the area it covers is large enough to present a critical non-state actor threat that can directly affect Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China's Xinjiang Province. Indirectly, but no less important, the problems festering in Southern Kyrgyzstan can quickly make their way north into the Eurasian Union and further afield into Russia proper, thereby compelling Moscow into some type of action to stem this virus before it becomes uncontrollable (to say nothing of the immediate danger it presents for Russian forces in Tajikistan). Some type of foreign action would have to be taken to resolve this issue, but it's impossible to know what it will look like. The only thing that can be ascertained is that it would involve the Kyrgyz authorities and potentially a multilateral force incorporating Tajik and/or Russian elements, with Uzbekistan and China notably not taking part (the former due to tensions over the 'media Crimea' and the latter due to its policy of non-interference).

Concluding Thoughts

Richard Miles' return from retirement in order to staff the US Embassy in Bishkek is more than just a random event. The Color Revolution specialist was ordered to Kyrgyzstan not to gently shuffle papers, but to forcibly shuffle the composition of the government. This is in accordance with the 21^st-century Reagan Doctrine that Hillary Clinton publicly unveiled in December 2012, whereby it was decreed that the US will do whatever it can to roll back Russian influence in the Near Abroad. In conjunction with the US-inspired destabilization that is projected to hit the country around the October Parliamentary elections, Washington also envisions pulling Tashkent away from its flirtation with Moscow through coaxing it into a 'media Crimea' in the Kyrgyz Fergana Valley. Dividing Uzbekistan from Russia in the same manner that Ukraine was separated from it a year prior is the ultimate strategic goal of the US in the region, since it would create a long-term Lead From Behind proxy to challenge Russian influence in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan's role, or more precisely, that of Southern Kyrgyzstan, is intended as nothing more than a permanently failed state abutting the Eurasian Union, Uzbekistan, and China, in order to continuously inflict destabilizing pressure on them. No matter which shape the oncoming chaos takes, it can be certain that the arrival of the 'Male Nuland' to Kyrgyzstan, freshly forced out of retirement to take on this pivotal role, portends the Central Asian anti-Russian equivalent of what Nuland unleashed in Eastern Europe over a year ago with EuroMaidan.

Andrew Korybko is the political analyst and journalist for Sputnik who currently lives and studies in Moscow, exclusively for ORIENTAL REVIEW.

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